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Summary
Studies have shown that autonomous mode behavior is
one cause of aircraft fatalities due to pilot error. In such
cases, the pilot is in a high state of psychological and
physiological arousal and tends to focus on one problem,
while ignoring more critical information. This study
examined the effect of training in physiological self-
recognition and regulation, as a means of improving crew
cockpit performance. Seventeen pilots were assigned to
the treatment and control groups matched for accumulated
flight hours. The treatment group comprised four pilots of
HC- 130 Hercules aircraft and four HH-65 Dolphin
helicopter pilots; the control group comprised three pilots
of HC-130s and six Dolphin helicopter pilots. During an
initial flight, physiological data were recorded for each
crewmember and individual crew performance was rated
by an instructor pilot. Eight crewmembers were then
taught to regulate their own physiological response levels
using Autogenic-Feedback Training (AFT). The
remaining subjects received no training. During a second
flight, treatment subjects showed significant improvement
in performance, while controls did not improve. The
results indicate that AFT management of high states of
physiological arousal may improve pilot performance
during emergency flying conditions.
Introduction
Human error is the largest single cause of accidental
mortality among aviators (ref. 1). It is not surprising then,
that increased attention has been placed on the human
factors associated with aircraft accidents. The Aviation
Safety Research Act of 1988, for example, directed the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to expand
research efforts examining the relationships between
human factors and aviation safety (ref. 2). A central
human factors problem, human error (HE) has been
identified as the leading cause of aviation mishaps in
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aircraft (ref. 3). Recent FAA reports reveal that HE is a
causal factor in 66% of air carrier incidents and accidents,
79% of commuter and 88% of general aviation accidents
(ref. 2). HEs account for a substantial number of military
aviation accidents as well. It has been estimated that in
excess of 50 to 70% aviation mishaps across all branches
of the armed forces are attributed to HE (refs. 4 and 5).
The Aviation Safety Commission (refs. 6 and 8) narrowly
defines the cause of accidents as pilot error only in those
instances where the error appears "undeniable." This
definition and the figures cited above can be misleading,
however, as a result of the simplistic approach generally
taken in the identification of HE as contributory or causal
in aircraft incidents. These classifications do not
adequately address the fact that HEs are the result of very
complex processes. The term "pilot error" carries with it
the implication that an aircraft commander was solely
responsible for a given accident as a result of some
discrete act of omission or commission. In point of fact,
errors are only rarely attributable to a single cause (ref. 7)
and culpability for accidents lies within the interaction
between human and other factors. These factors typically
include mission demand characteristics, environmental
considerations and equipment design. Another factor
often involved is the abrupt onset of emergency
conditions, where the impact on task performance has
been demonstrated (ref. 9).
Historically, attempts to decrease HEs in aviation have
focused on the automation of tasks leading increasingly to
the pilot as a backup to the automated systems (ref. 2).
This approach, however, does not adequately address the
full spectrum of human factors problems. As automation
and complexity increase, so does the potential for HE
(ref. 10). Within automated systems there is the
expectation that humans will remain alert during boring
periods and deftly assume control of the aircraft in the
event of a critical situation. However, the complacency
that accompanies prolonged reliance on automated
systems may reduce one's ability to respond effectivel? in
emergency situations (ref. 11). It is becoming increasingly
recognized that efforts to reduce HE must be aimed more
directly at the human element.
CockpitResource Management (CRM) is a relatively
recent attempt to reduce HEs in the multi-crew cockpit
(ref. 12). CRM attempts to address the HE issue through
enhanced communication and workload distribution and
appears to have been a fairly successful strategy. A
primary assumption of CRM training is that crew coordi-
nation will become overlearned, thereby increasing the
probability that it will be utilized during stressful situa-
tions. This assumption may be unrealistic as these crew
coordination and communication skills may become
peripheral tasks during an inflight emergency, as the
pilots central focus may well be with stick and rudder
activities. Perhaps the primary value of CRM is as a
preventive measure. That is, this training may produce
enhanced crew effectiveness, thereby reducing the likeli-
hood of those errors caused by crew coordination
degradation.
But the problem of HE incidents are not addressed
sufficiently by CRM training alone. Reasonable evidence
exists to conclude that pilots may lose control of their
aircraft as a direct result of reactive stress (refs. 13-17).
The condition in which a high state of physiological
arousal is accompanied by a narrowing of the focus of
attention can be referred to as autonomous mode behavior
(AMB). This study examined the efficacy of physiological
self-regulation training as a means of improving pilot
performance during emergency flying conditions. A
number of studies have produced evidence that this type
of training effectively reduces physiolgical arousal with a
resultant efficacious effect on operational efficiency in
student pilots (refs. 16 and 18). The specific method used
in the present study was Autogenic-Feedback Training
(AFT), which was developed by Cowings et al as a
potential treatment for space motion sickness of
astronauts aboard the space shuttle (refs. 19-21). This
method has also been used successfully by the U.S. Air
Force to control airsickness in military flight crews
(refs. 22 and 23).
AFT has advantages over other methods for this particular
application because it enables training individuals to regu-
late the levels of multiple physiological responses simul-
taneously, thus enabling a more system-wide reduction in
reactivity to stressors. AFT was designed to be adminis-
tered in a relatively short period of time (6 hrs total), can
reliably produce sufficient autonomic control necessary to
reduce responses to severe environmental stressors (i.e.,
motion sickness stimuli); and has been demonstrated to be
effective in a wide population of subjects under a variety
of stimulus conditions (ref. 19).
Materials and Methods
Subjects
All subjects were active-duty Coast Guard personnel, and
received no additional compensation for their participa-
tion. Their informed consent was obtained prior to the
initiation of the study. The research protocol was
approved by the Clinical Investigation/Human Use
Committee of Tripler Army Medical Center. The 17 pilots
who served as subjects were volunteers from the Coast
Guard Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii. These crew-
members consisted of 7 men from fixed-wing aircraft
(HC- 130), and 9 men and one woman from rotary wing
aircraft (HH-65). Following an initial flight, subjects were
assigned to one of two groups (treatment or control),
matched for accumulated flight hours. The treatment
group comprised four pilots from fixed-wing aircraft and
four helicopter pilots; the control group comprised three
fixed-wing pilots and six helicopter pilots. No attempt
was made to match groups for sex or type of aircraft.
Apparatus
Physiological responses monitored were: respiration rate,
with a pneumograph (PNG) placed around the subject's
chest; heart rate (HR),with electrodes located at precordial
sites; skin conductance level (SCL) electrodes placed on
the underside of the right wrist; skin temperature using a
thermistor placed on the lateral side of the right small
finger, and muscle activity (EMG) with surface electrode
placement bilaterally on the upper trapezius.
Electrode/transducer wires were secured to each subject
and exited the flight suit at the collar opening and con-
nected to J&J 1-330 data acquisition system mounted
behind the subject's headrest. Cables connecting the
modules to a laptop computer were taped to the deck of
the aircraft. Neither motor movements or sensations of the
subject or other crewmembers were inhibited by the
instruments. In both aircraft and ground-based training
sessions, these data were digitized and stored as
0.75-second averages on a lap-top computer.
Procedures
Initially, all subjects participated in an intense emergency
flying condition "check ride." Physiological monitoring
and evaluation of performance commenced with the pre-
flight checklist and continued throughout the flight
scenario, terminating with the aircraft's return to the
ramp. Allowing for the differences in flight parameters of
the two types of aircraft flown and given the inherent
limitationsofconductingafieldstudy,eachflight
scenariowasessentiallythesame.
TheairborneportionofthisstudytookplaceonU.S.
CoastGuardHC-130andHH-65aircraft.Actual aircraft
(in contrast to simulators) were utilized for this study
primarily because it is methodologically desirable to
study, as much as possible, real-life situations with their
inherent uncertainties. No modifications to the aircraft
were made and each flight carried its routine crew com-
plement. These crew members performed their usual
duties aboard the HH-65 and HC- 130, with one exception
on the HC-130 flights: the navigator, while on the aircraft,
was not stationed at his table on the flight deck. As the
scenario did not require his presence in the cockpit, his
table was utilized as a work station for the physiologic
data acquisition.
HC-130 emergency flight scenario- Subsequent to the
pre-flight and taxi and take off, subjects climbed to a
cruising altitude as designated by the air traffic controller
(ATC). As a peak performance exercise, the subject was
instructed to return to the traffic pattern and execute a
series of touch and go maneuvers (one systems-normal,
one simulated number one engine fire, and one automatic
direction finder instrument approach). Upon completion
of these tasks the subject departed the pattern at an alti-
tude assigned by the ATC for a search and rescue (SAR)
case in which there was ostensibly a downed A-4 pilot
approximately 20 miles off shore. In order to assess the
subject's performance and physiologic response while
experiencing a considerable stressor, a compounding
emergency condition was simulated. Once the search
pattern had been established, the cargo door opened and
secured, and the aircraft had descended to 200 feet above
ground level (AGL), a turbine overheat of the number two
engine followed by an uncontained turbine failure of that
engine was simulated. The subject was then notified by a
confederate of simulated airframe damage, a minor fuel
leak from the number two engine, and that a crew member
had sustained injuries resulting presumably from shrapnel.
This announcement was followed by left hand and Essen-
tial AC bus failure indicators. Moments later, the instruc-
tor pilot communicated to the subject that there was
simulated smoke (without fire) emanating from under the
flightdeck, there was charring in the vicinity of the num-
ber one generator on the nacelle paint, and the master fire
light, T-handle, and a visible confirmation revealed that
the number one engine was on fire. Upon stabilizing the
aircraft, the subject was directed to maintain a cruising
altitude as instructed by the ATC, return to base and make
a two engine full stop landing. This was further compli-
cated by a simulated landing gear malfunction which
required a simulated manual extension of the landing
gear.
HH-65 emergency flight scenario- Following pre-flight
and taxi to a hover-take oft', the subject climbed to the
ATC designated altitude. The subject was then instructed
to execute a series of touch and go maneuvers (one stan-
dard no hover, one standard engine stall at takeoff, and
one simulated number one engine stall to a running land-
ing). Upon completion of these tasks the subject departed
the pattern at an altitude assigned by the ATC for a SAR
case in which there was ostensibly a distressed boat that
would likely require removal of a crew member with
unknown injuries. While proceeding to the vessel's posi-
tion, the aircraft experienced an AC bus malfunction with
a resulting loss of the gyro and pitch and roll controls.
Upon stabilizing the aircraft and returning to systems-
normal flight, the subject was directed to the position of
the simulated craft and instructed to prepare to hoist the
injured party aboard. While in a hover at approximately
50 feet AGL, the subject was given a servo-jam warning
followed by a secondary hydraulic failure indicator which
resulted in the rudder pedals being fixed. The subject was
then requested to enter a holding pattern and return to
base and land the "impaired" aircraft as instructed by the
ATC. The subject was then directed to fly from the
runway to the outer ramp (helo-pad). As the subject was
on short-final approach, the instructor pilot simulated a
stall of the number one engine from which the subject was
to recover and land the aircraft as instructed.
Performance evaluation- Pilot performance measures
involved subjective assessments of two instructor pilots
who served as observers, with roughly equal numbers of
treatment and control subjects assigned to each, The
observers were not told the group assignments of individ-
ual pilots, and they graded the same individuals on both
flights. Two types of observer ratings were obtained, both
adapted from performance scales developed by Foushee
et al. (ref. 24). The first type involved performance
judgments made routinely by supervisory check pilots and
were grouped by specific phases of the flight (i.e.,
checklist execution, taxi/takeoff, cruise, touch and go,
cruise/SAR, emergency initiation, emergency return to
base, and emergency approach and landing). Performance
dimensions examined by this study were: stress
managment; crew coordination and communication;
aircraft handling; and planning and situational awareness.
Each perlormance dimension was scored on a five-point
Likert scale with the following anchors: I = below
avera,oe performance; 2 = slightly below avera,,e
3 = average; 4 = slightly above average; and 5 = above
average. The observer was instructed to circle N/A Inot
applicable) should a dimension not apply' for some reason.
The second type of rating was designed to assess the
observer's overall impression of performance throughout
the flight (ref. 24), and was done upon completion of each
flight.All subjectswereinstructednottodiscussthe
specificaspectsoftheirparticipationin thestudywith
othercrewmembers.
Autogenic-feedbaektraining-Thetreatmentcondition
consistedoftwelve45minutesessionsutilizingaregimen
ofAFTtrainingbasedupontheprotocoldevelopedby
Cowings(ref.19).Thisprotocolincludedirected
biofeedback,discriminationtrainingandstresschallenge
trainingwithandwithoutfeedbackdesignedtoincrease
subjectefficiencyinmaintainingappropriate
psychophysiologicalcontrol.Withrespecttothestress
challengecondition,subjectswererequiredtomaintain
physiologiccontrolwithinidentifiedparameterswhile
activelyinvolvedinavideogamechallenge.The
treatmentgroupalsoutilizeddailyprogressiverelaxation
exercisesviaaudiotape.Thecontrolgroupreceivedno
treatment.Thisdesignwasdeemedappropriateb cause
previousresearchbyToscanoandCowings(ref.25),
demonstratedthatcontrolgroupsubjectsgiven"sham
training,"withthesamenumberofexposuresto
experimentersastreatmentgroupsubjectshadno
advantageovera"notreatment"controlgroupin
improvingtheirtolerancetoenvironmentalstress.
Followingcompletionofthetreatmentcondition,each
pilotagainflewthesimulatedemergencyscenarioatthe
sameapproximatetimeofday,andwiththesamerateras
in theirinitialflight.
Results
FigureI showstheaverageoverallscoresobtainedfrom
eachgrouponthefirstandsecondemergencyflights.
Treatmentgroupsubjectsshowanimprovementi all
nineperformancedimensionswhileControlsubjectsshow
higherpost-testcoresononlytwooftheninedimensions
measuredandactuallydecreasedperformancescoresfor
fiveofthesedimensions.
Performancedatawereanalyzedwithnonparametric
statistics:Mann-Whitney-UtestsandWilcoxanSign-
Rankstests.Tableslaandbshowtheresultsofanalyses
whichcomparedperformancescoresbetweenandwithin
groupsduringspecificphasesoftheflights.Therewasno
significantdifferencebetweengroupsonthefirsttest,
withtheexceptionthatControlsubjectsscoredsignifi-
cantlyhigheronAircraftHandlingduringCruiseSearch
andRescue(tablelb).Treatmentgroupsubjectshad
improvedtheirperformanceaftertrainingandthetwo
groups were no longer significantly different during the
Cruise Search and Resuce phase of the second flight.
Following training, the performance of AFT subjects
during specific phases of flight were significantly better
than that of the controls for stress managment, crew coor-
dination and communication, as well as planning and
situational awareness. There was no significant difference
between groups in Aircraft handling during any phases of
the second flight.
Comparisons within groups revealed that AFT subjects
showed significant improvements in specific phases of the
flight for all performance categories, while Control sub-
jects showed no improvement. In fact, Control subjects
showed a significant decrease in crew coordination and
communication during the touch and go phase of flight.
Physiological data obtained during flight and training
sessions were not analyzed and will be presented in
another paper.
Table 2 shows the results of Wiicoxan Signs-Ranks tests
which was performed to examine the performance
category, Crew Coordination and Communication, in
detail. AFT subjects performed significantly better than
Controls in 10 of the 13 specific dimensions of this
category.
Discussion
The results support the proposition that AFT improves
pilot performance during emergency flying conditions.
Specifically, the data reveal that those pilots trained in
AFT demonstrated improved overall knowledge of the
aircraft and procedures, technical proficiency, and
performance through the flight scenario. Of particular
importance is a demonstrated improvement in overall
performance and execution of duties as well as crew
coordination and communication during that segment of
the flight where multiple compounding emergencies were
experienced. This suggests that AFT may be effective as a
countermeasure for pilot stress-related performance
decrements.
The improved crew coordination and communication
performance found in the AFT subjects is particularly
noteworthy, as these factors are emphasized in CRM
approaches to the management of human error. AFT
treatment effects were demonstrated in those dimensions
involving communications with crew members, crew
briefings, workload delegation, planning, and overall
technical proficiency. As all of the subjects of this study
have had some form of CRM training, as well as compa-
rable previous experience in emergency flying conditions.
the demonstrated improvement of these measures by the
treatment group suggests that AFT may aid in the suc-
cessful utilization and expansion of these skills. It is
hypothesized that this improvement occurred because
AFT reduced individuals' physiologic reactivity during
stress. As a result, crew coordination and communication
factors were not reduced to the pilot's periphery. Given
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Figure 1. Changes in overall performance during emergency flight scenarios.
Table la. Group performance dimensions by phase of flight: Mann-Whitney U-Test
Crew Coordination and Communication Between Groups
AFT vs Controls
Within Groups
pre- vs post-tests
pre-test post-test AFT Controls
Checklist Execution - p < 0.05 p < 0.05 -
Taxi/takeoff - p < 0.05 - -
Initial Cruise ....
Touch & Go - - - p < 0.05*
Cruise Search and Rescue - - p < 0.05 -
Emergency Initiation - p < 0.005 p < 0.01 -
Emergency Return to Base ....
Emergency Approach and Landing ....
Planing and Situational Awareness Between Groups
AFT vs Controls
Within Groups
pre- vs post-tests
pre-test post-test APT Controls
Checklist Execution - - -
Taxi/takeoff - p < 0.05 -
Initial Cruise - - -
Touch & Go - p < 0.05 -
Cruise Search and Rescue - - -
Emergency Initiation - - -
Emergency Return to Base - - p < 0.05
Emergency Approach and Landing - - p < 0.05
, i | , , ,
* Control subjects scored significantly lower during the second flight.
Table lb. Group performance dimensions by phase of flight: Mann-Whitney U-Test
Stress Management Between Groups
AFT vs Controls
Within Groups
pre- vs post-tests
pre-test post-test AFT Controls
Checklist Execution - - -
Taxi/takeoff - - -
Initial Cruise - - -
Touch & Go - p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Cruise Search and Rescue - - -
Emergency Initiation - p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Emergency Return to Base - p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Emergency Approach and Landing - p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Aircraft Handling
Checklist Execution
Taxi/takeoff
Initial Cruise
Touch & Go
Cruise Search and Rescue
Emergency Initiation
Emergency Return to Base
Emergency Approach and Landing
m
Between Groups
AFT vs Controls
pre-test post-test
Within Groups
pre- vs post-tests
AFT Controls
m
p < 0.05*
p < 0.05
p < 0.05
p < 0.05
p < 0.05
* Control subjects scored significantly higher than AFT subjects during their first flight.
Table 2. Improvement in specific dimensions of crew coordination and communications
during the second flight scenario: Wilcoxan Sign-ranks test
AFT vs. Control
Dimension N z p<
Briefing thorough, establishes open communication, addresses coordination, planning,
team creation, and anticipates problems 8 2.20 0.05
Communications timely, relevant, complete and verified 8 2.20 0.05
Inquiry/Questions practiced 8 1.69 0.05
Assertion/Advocacy practiced 8 1.82 0.05
Decisions communicated and acknowledged 8 1.57 -
Crew self-critique of decisions and actions 7 1.82 0.05
Concern for accomplishment of tasks at hand 8 0.91 -
Interpersonnel relationships/group climate 8 1.82 0.05
Overall vigilance 8 1.09 -
Preparation and planning for in-flight activities 8 2.20 0.05
Distractions avoided or prioritized 8 1.34 -
Workload distributed and communicated 8 2.20 0.05
Overall workload 8 0.91 -
Overall technical proficiency 8 2.02 0.05
Overall crew effectiveness 8 2.02 0.05
the current emphasis on crew coordination and communi-
cation skills in the reduction of human error in flight,
identification and control of the physiologic mechanisms
that enhance or inhibit these activities warrant further
study.
The problems associated with AMB are manifest when
the pilot becomes saturated with tasks requiring increased
complex decision-making skills. When a major ingredient
of this saturation includes the pilot's own physiology, the
recognition of internal cues that precede this hypersympa-
thetic arousal and initiation of appropriate corrective
action become increasingly important. Utilizing one's
physiology as an asset rather than as an undesirable event
to be ignored, the available resources to deal with an
external problem are increased. It is suggested that, by
expanding the pool of available resources for dealing with
in-flight emergencies, the pilot is better able to manage
the endogenous and exogenous stressors being
experienced.
While the small subject population in this study precluded
fixed vs. rotary wing comparisons, air frame and related
mission requirement influences are areas that necessitate
further study. Future studies will determine if perfor-
mance improvements are related to type of aircraft and if
those pilots of multiple crew aircraft gain more value
from training than those flying tactical (single or dual
crew) aircraft. Use of ambulatory monitoring equipment
for recording physiological responses in flight would be
less obtrusive than the instrumentation used in the present
study and will provide objective indices of the effects of
training on treatment group subjects. More comprehensive
examinations of AFT and it's effect on pilot performance
may reveal that training in recognition and regulation of
one's own physiological reactions to environmental stress
should become a portion of the standard curriculum of
aerospace crews.
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comprised four pilots of He- 130 Hercules aircraft and four HH-65 Dolphin helicopter pilots; the control group
comprised three pilots of He- i 30s and six Dolphin helicopter pilots. During an initial flight, physiological data
were recorded for each crewmember and individual crew performance was rated by an instructor pilot. Eight
crewmembers were then taught to regulate their own physiological response levels using Autogenic-Feedback
Training (AFT). The remaining subjects received no training. During a second flight, treatment subjects showed
significant improvement in performance, while controls did not improve. The results indicate that A[-T
management of high states of physiological arousal may improve pilot performance during emergency flying
conditions.
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